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This paper studies an agent-based model that bridges Keynesian theories of demand-
generation and Schumpeterian theories of technology-fueled economic growth.
We employ the model to investigate the properties of macroeconomic dynamics and
the impact of public polices on supply, demand and the ‘‘fundamentals’’ of the economy.
We ﬁnd profound complementarities between factors inﬂuencing aggregate demand
and drivers of technological change that affect both ‘‘short-run’’ ﬂuctuations and long-
term growth patterns. From a normative point of view, simulations show a
corresponding complementarity between ‘‘Keynesian’’ and ‘‘Schumpeterian’’ policies
in sustaining long-run growth paths characterized by milder ﬂuctuations and relatively
lower unemployment levels. The matching or mismatching between innovative
exploration of new technologies and the conditions of demand generation appear to
suggest the presence of two distinct ‘‘regimes’’ of growth (or absence thereof)
characterized by different short-run ﬂuctuations and unemployment levels.
& 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This work studies an agent-based model (ABM) of endogenous growth and business cycles and explores its properties
under different public policies impacting on supply, demand, and the ‘‘fundamentals’’ of the economy.
The model addresses three major, interrelated, questions. First, it investigates the processes by which technological
innovations affect macro-variables such as unemployment rates and, in the longer term, growth rates. In the current
macroeconomic jargon, we explicitly model a ﬁrm-speciﬁc, endogenous generation of supply shocks, their diffusion and the
ways they ultimately drive macro-aggregates. Together with this ‘‘Schumpeterian’’ question, second, we ask how such
endogenous changes in the ‘‘fundamentals’’ of the economy interact with demand conditions. This is a basic ‘‘Keynesian’’
question. How does aggregate demand modulates the diffusion and the macro-impact of technological innovations? And,
conversely, how does it affect, if at all, the amount of search and the degree of exploitation of innovation opportunities
themselves? Third, we explore long-term effects of demand conditions. Is the long-term growth just driven by changes
in the technological ‘‘fundamentals’’? Or, can variations in aggregate demand inﬂuence future dynamics? And, ultimately,
can one identify multiple growth paths whose selection depends on demand and institutional conditions—determining,
e.g. ﬁscal policies.ll rights reserved.
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‘‘policy laboratory’’ where both business-cycle and growth effects of alternative public interventions may be evaluated
under different techno-economic scenarios. In that, the model allows to experiment with an ensemble of policies, related
to the structural features of the economy (concerning, e.g., technology, industry structure and competition) on the one
hand, and to demand macro-management, on the other.
Historically, a major divide has emerged in macroeconomics theories. Long-run approaches have traditionally dealt
with growth issues in a strict sense, trying to account for (broken-linear or stochastic) trends present in macro time series,
while leaving to ‘‘short-run’’ models the task of explaining economic ﬂuctuations around the trend. An early example is the
way the IS-LM interpretation of Keynes (Hicks, 1937) and the models rooted in Solow (1956) found their division of labor
addressing business cycles and growth, respectively.1
Since then, the balance has been shifting over time. At one extreme, the ‘‘new classical economics’’ has boldly claimed
the irrelevance of any ‘‘Keynesian’’ feature of the economy. New Keynesian models have defended the turf of ‘‘non-
fundamental’’ ﬂuctuations most often on the grounds of informational and behavioral frictions (an insightful overview is in
Blanchard, 2009), with just a minority holding the view that such ‘‘imperfections’’ are in fact structural, long-term
characteristics of the economy (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993a, b; Akerlof, 2002, 2007, among
them). Lacking a better name, let us call the latter Hard New Keynesians, HNK henceforth.
More recently, the new neoclassical synthesis between real business cycle (RBC) and a major breed of New Keynesian
models has reﬁned the interactions and the territorial divisions between ‘‘fundamental dynamics’’ and higher frequency,
‘‘non-fundamental’’ shocks within the dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) theoretical family (cf. the classic
Woodford, 2003; Galı´ and Gertler, 2007). In fact, DSGE models feature a core with an RBC engine to which one may easily
add sticky prices, imperfect competition, monetary-policy (Taylor-like) rules, and whatever can be imaginatively squeezed
into the underlying ‘‘structural model’’.2 Indeed, there is hardly any Schumpeter in terms of endogenous innovation in
DSGE models.
From a quite different angle, endogenous growth models, notwithstanding very different features (from Romer, 1990 to
Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999), possess an implicit or explicit Schumpeterian engine:
innovation and thus the dynamics in the ‘‘technological fundamentals’’ of the economy is endogenous. At the same time,
‘‘non-fundamental’’ (e.g. demand-related) ﬂuctuations do not appear in this family of models. Reﬁnements, such as Aghion
and Howitt (1998),3 do entail equilibrium ﬂuctuations wherein Keynesian features do not play any role.4
Somewhat similarly, evolutionary models, as pioneered by Nelson and Winter (1982), are driven by a Schumpeterian
core with endogenous innovation, but do largely neglect too any demand-related driver of macroeconomic activity.5
The model which follows, shares evolutionary roots, but in tune with HNK insights (cf. for example Stiglitz, 1994) tries
to explore the feedbacks between the factors inﬂuencing aggregate demand and those driving technological change. By
doing that we begin to offer a uniﬁed framework jointly accounting for long-term dynamics and higher frequencies
ﬂuctuations.
The model is certainly post-Walrasian (Colander, 2006; Colander et al., 2008) meaning that it goes beyond the purported
Walrasian foundations squeezed into the representative-agent assumption nested in DSGE models and the general
commitment to market clearing. In that, well in tune with the growing literature on agent-based computational economics
(ACE; see Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008), the model meets Solow’s (2008) plea for
microheterogeneity: a multiplicity of agents interact without any ex ante commitment to the reciprocal consistency of
their actions.6
Furthermore, the model—alike most evolutionary ABMs—is ‘‘structural’’ in the sense that it explicitly builds on a
representation of what agents do, how they adjust, etc. In that, it is as far as the DSGE perspective from ‘‘old Keynesian’’
models studying the relations amongst aggregate variables without any explicit microfoundation. At the same time, our
commitment is to ‘‘phenomenologically’’ describe microbehaviors as close as one can get to available microevidence.
Akerlof’s (2002) advocacy of a ‘‘behavioral microeconomics’’, we believe, builds on that notion. In fact, this is our ﬁrst
fundamental disciplining device. A second, complementary one involves the ability of the model jointly to account for an
ensemble of stylized facts regarding both ‘‘micro/meso’’ aggregates such as indicators of industrial structures (e.g. ﬁrm size
distributions, productivity dispersions, ﬁrm growth rates) together with macro statistical properties (including rates of
output growth, output volatility, unemployment rates, etc.).1 For an interesting reconstruction of the econometric counterpart of such a divide in the 1930s and 1940s debate, see Louca (2001).
2 As Blanchard (2009, p. 26) puts it, ‘‘To caricature only slightly: a macroeconomic article today follows strict, haiku-like, rules: it starts from a general
equilibrium structure, in which individuals maximize the expected present value of utility, ﬁrms maximize their value, and markets clear. Then,
it introduces a twist, be it an imperfection or the closing of a particular set of markets, and works out the general equilibrium implications. It then
performs a numerical simulation, based on calibration, showing that the model performs well. It ends with a welfare assessment.’’
3 See also Aghion et al. (2010), Aghion and Marinescu (2007) and Aghion et al. (2008).
4 Ironically, given the lack of stability of ‘‘new growth’’ trajectories, ‘‘Keynesianism’’ could show its full force. We shall go back to this point below.
5 See, however, the exceptions of Dosi et al. (1994) and Fagiolo and Dosi (2003). Cf. Dawid (2006) for an exhaustive review of ABMs of innovation and
technological change.
6 For germane ABMs with both some Keynesian and Schumpeterian elements see Verspagen (2002), Ciarli et al. (2008), Saviotti and Pyka (2008), and
the discussion in Silverberg and Verspagen (2005).
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the European project EURACE (http://www.eurace.org), which features a large-scale ABM aiming at capturing the main
characteristics of the European economy and addressing European-policy analyses (Deissenberg et al., 2008; Dawid et al.,
2008). Unlike EURACE models, however, we keep the scale of the system relatively small, in line with traditional
macroeconomic ABMs with little overall calibration exercises, albeit with attention to empirically sound microrules and
interaction mechanisms.
The model below describes an economy composed of ﬁrms, consumers/workers and a public sector. Firms belong to
two industries. In the ﬁrst one, ﬁrms perform R&D and produce heterogeneous machine tools. Firms in the second industry
invest in new machines and produce a homogenous consumption good. Consumers sell their labor to ﬁrms in both sectors
and fully consume the income they receive. The government levies taxes on workers’ wages and ﬁrms’ proﬁts and it
provides unemployed workers with a fraction of the market wage.
As customary in evolutionary/ACE perspectives, the policy framework studied here is explored via computer simulations.
To overcome the well-known problems related to sensitivity to the choice of parameters, possibly arising in ABMs,7 we look
for policy implications that: (i) are robust to reasonable changes in the parameters of the model; (ii) refer to model setups
and parametrizations wherein the output of the model is empirically validated (i.e., simulated microeconomic and
macroeconomic data possess statistical properties similar to those empirically observed in reality). We consider this as a
value added of our study, as very often in the literature policy experiments are performed without imposing any ex ante
empirical-validation requirement on the model (Fukac and Pagan, 2006; Canova, 2008; Fagiolo and Roventini, forthcoming).
Policy conﬁgurations are captured by different ‘‘control’’ parameters and different institutional, market or industry setups.
The impact of different policies is then quantitatively assessed in terms of ensuing aggregates such as average output
growth, output volatility, average unemployment, etc. One of the main insights stemming from our extensive policy-
simulation exercises is a vindication of a strong complementarity between Schumpeterian policies addressing innovative
activities and Keynesian demand-management policies. Both types of policies seem to be necessary to put the economy into
a long-run sustained growth path. Schumpeterian policies potentially foster economic growth, but they do not appear to be
able alone to yield sustained long-run growth. In a broad parameter region, ‘‘fundamental’’ (endogenously generated)
changes in technology are unable to fully propagate in terms of demand generation and ultimately output growth. By the
same token, demand shocks (in the simplest case, induced by government ﬁscal policies) bear persistent effects upon output
levels, rates of growth, and rates of innovations. In that, Keynesian policies not only have a strong impact on output volatility
and unemployment, but seem to be also a necessary condition for long-run economic growth.
In fact, our results suggest that the matching or mismatching between innovative exploration of new technologies and
the conditions of demand generation appear to yield two distinct ‘‘regimes’’ of growth (or absence thereof), also
characterized by different short-run ﬂuctuations and unemployment levels. Even when Keynesian policies allow for a
sustained growth, their tuning affects the amplitude of ﬂuctuations and the long-term levels of unemployment and output.
Symmetrically, ﬂuctuations and unemployment rates are also affected by ‘‘Schumpeterian policies’’, holding constant
macro-demand management rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3 we perform empirical validation
checks and in Section 4 we present results of policy exercises. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses future extensions.
2. The model
As already mentioned, our simple economy is composed of a machine-producing sector made of F1 ﬁrms (denoted by
the subscript i), a consumption-good sector made of F2 ﬁrms (denoted by the subscript j), L
S consumers/workers, and a
public sector. Capital-good ﬁrms invest in R&D and produce heterogenous machines. Consumption-good ﬁrms combine
machine tools bought by capital-good ﬁrms and labor in order to produce a ﬁnal product for consumers. The public sector
levies taxes on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and pay unemployment beneﬁts. Innovations are clearly endogenous to our economy. It is the
uncertain outcome of the search efforts of the producers of capital equipment and exerts its impact throughout the
economy via both the lowering of the production costs of such equipment and its diffusion in the ‘‘downstream’’
consumption-good sector. Before accurately describing the model, we brieﬂy provide the timeline of events occurring in
each time step.
2.1. The timeline of events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic decisions take place in sequential order:1.‘‘Ag
andMachine-tool ﬁrms perform R&D trying to discover new products and more efﬁcient production techniques and to
imitate the technology and the products of their competitors.7 See Fagiolo et al. (2007) for a discussion; more on that in Section 3. The potential for policy exercises in ABMs is discussed in the special issue on
ent-Based Models for Economic Policy Design’’ of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008 (vol. 67, no. 2), edited by Herbert Dawid
Giorgio Fagiolo.
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3. Consumption-good ﬁrms decide how much to produce and invest. If investment is positive, consumption-good ﬁrms
choose their supplier and send their orders.
4. In both industries ﬁrms hire workers according to their production plans and start producing.
5. Imperfectly competitive consumption-good market opens. The market shares of ﬁrms evolve according to their price
competitiveness.
6. Entry and exit take places. In both sectors ﬁrms with near zero market shares and negative net liquid assets are
eschewed from the two industries and replaced by new ﬁrms.
7. Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered and become part of the capital stock at time t+1.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP, investment, employment) are computed, summing over the
corresponding microeconomic variables.
Let us now turn to a more detailed description of the model and of the agents’ behaviors, which—to repeat—we try to
keep as close as we can to what we know they actually do as distinct from what they ought to do under more perfect
informational circumstances.
2.2. The capital-good industry
The technology of a capital-good ﬁrms is ðAti ,Bti Þ, where the former coefﬁcient stands for the labor productivity of the
machine-tool manufactured by i for the consumption-good industry (a rough measure of producer quality), while the latter
coefﬁcient is the labor productivity of the production technique employed by ﬁrm i itself. The positive integer t denotes
the current technology vintage. Given the monetary wage w, the unit cost of production of capital-good ﬁrms is
ciðtÞ ¼
wðtÞ
Bti
: ð1Þ
With a ﬁxed mark-up (m140) pricing rule,
8 prices (pi) are deﬁned as
piðtÞ ¼ ð1þm1ÞciðtÞ: ð2Þ
The unit labor cost of production in the consumption-good sector associated with each machine of vintage t, produced by
ﬁrm i is
cðAti ,tÞ ¼
wðtÞ
Ati
:
Firms in the capital-good industry ‘‘adaptively’’ strive to increase their market shares and their proﬁts trying to improve
their technology both via innovation and imitation. Both are costly processes: ﬁrms invest in R&D a fraction of their past
sales (Si):
RDiðtÞ ¼ nSiðt1Þ, ð3Þ
with 0ono1. R&D expenditures are employed to hire researchers paying the market wage w(t).9 Firms split their R&D
efforts between innovation (IN) and imitation (IM) according to the parameter x 2 ½0,110:
INiðtÞ ¼ xRDiðtÞ,
IMiðtÞ ¼ ð1xÞRDiðtÞ:
We model innovation as a two steps process. The ﬁrst one determines whether a ﬁrm obtains or not an access to
innovation—irrespectively of whether it is ultimately a success or a failure—through a draw from a Bernoulli distribution,
whose parameter yini ðtÞ is given by
yini ðtÞ ¼ 1ez1 INiðtÞ, ð4Þ
with 0oz1r1. Note that according to (4), there are some scale-related returns to R&D investment: access to innovative
discoveries is more likely if a ﬁrm puts more resources into R&D. If a ﬁrm innovates, it may draw a new machine
embodying technology ðAini ,Bini Þ according to
Aini ðtÞ ¼ AiðtÞð1þxAi ðtÞÞ
Bini ðtÞ ¼ BiðtÞð1þxBi ðtÞÞ,8 Survey data evidence summarized in Fabiani et al. (2006) show that European ﬁrms mostly set prices according to mark-up rules.
9 In the following, we assume all capital-producing ﬁrms to be identical in their R&D propensity. This is not too far from reality: R&D intensities are
ely sector speciﬁc and associated with the sector-wide nature of innovative opportunities and modes of innovative search (more in Pavitt, 1984; Dosi,
8; Klevorick et al., 1995).
10 Firms on the technological frontier, lacking anyone to imitate, obviously invest all their R&D budget in the search for innovations.
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B are two independent draws from a Beta(a1,b1) distribution over the support ½x1,x1 with x1 belonging to the
interval [1,0] and x1 to [0,1]. Note that the notional possibilities of technological advance—i.e. technological
opportunities—are captured by the support of the Beta distribution and by its shape. So, for example, with low opportunities
the largest probability density falls over ‘‘failed’’ innovations—that is potential capital goods which are ‘‘worse’’ in terms of
costs and performances than those already produced by the searching ﬁrm. Conversely, under a condition of rich opportunities,
innovations which dominate incumbent technologies will be drawn with high probability. As we shall show below, a crucial
role of ‘‘Schumpeterian’’ technology policies is precisely that of inﬂuencing opportunities and microcapabilities.
Alike innovation search, imitation follows a two steps procedure. The possibilities of accessing imitation come from
sampling a Bernoulli(yimi ðtÞ):
yimi ðtÞ ¼ 1ez2IMiðtÞ, ð5Þ
with 0oz2r1. Firms accessing the second stage are able to copy the technology of one of the competitors (Aiim,Biim).
We assume that ﬁrms are more likely to imitate competitors with similar technologies and we use a Euclidean metric to
compute the technological distance between every pair of ﬁrms to weight imitation probabilities.
All ﬁrms which draw a potential innovation or imitation have to put it on production or keep producing the incumbent
generation of machines. Comparing the technology competing for adoption, ﬁrms choose to manufacture the machine
characterized by the best tradeoff between price and efﬁciency. More speciﬁcally, knowing that consumption-good ﬁrms
invest following a payback period routine (see Section 2.3), capital-good ﬁrms select the machine to produce according to
the following rule:
min½phi ðtÞþbchðAhi ,tÞ, h¼ t,in,im, ð6Þ
where b is a positive payback period parameter (see Eq. (10)). Once the type of machine is chosen, we capture the
imperfect information pervading the market assuming that each ﬁrm sends a ‘‘brochure’’ with the price and the
productivity of its offered machines to both its historical (HCi) clients and to a random sample of potential new customers
(NCi), whose size is proportional to HCi (i.e., NCiðtÞ ¼ gHCiðtÞ, with 0ogo1).
2.3. The consumption-good industry
Consumption-good ﬁrms produce a homogenous goods using capital (i.e. their stock of machines) and labor under
constant returns to scale. Firms plan their production (Qj) according to adaptive demand expectations (D
e
j ):
Dej ðtÞ ¼ f ðDjðt1Þ,Djðt2Þ, . . . ,DjðthÞÞ, ð7Þ
where Dj(t1) is the demand actually faced by ﬁrm j at time t1 (h positive integer).11 The desired level of production
(Qdj ) depends on the expected demand as well as on the desired inventories (N
d
j ) and the actual stock of inventories
(Nj):
Qdj ðtÞ ¼Dej ðtÞþNdj ðtÞNjðt1Þ, ð8Þ
with Ndj ðtÞ ¼ iDej ðtÞ, i 2 ½0,1. The output of consumption-good ﬁrms is constrained by their capital stock (Kj). If the desired
capital stock (Kdj )—computed as a function of the desired level of production—is higher than the current capital stock, ﬁrms
invest (EIdj ) in order to expand their production capacity
12:
EIdj ðtÞ ¼ Kdj ðtÞKjðtÞ: ð9Þ
The capital stock of each ﬁrm is obviously composed of heterogenous vintages of machines with different productivity.
We deﬁne XjðtÞ as the set of all vintages of machine-tools belonging to ﬁrm j at time t. Firms scrap machines following a
payback period routine. Through that, technical change and equipment prices inﬂuence the replacement decisions of
consumption-good ﬁrms.13 More speciﬁcally, ﬁrm j replaces machine Ati 2 XjðtÞ according to its technology obsolescence as
well as the price of new machines:
RSjðtÞ ¼ Ati 2 XjðtÞ :
pðtÞ
cðAi,t,tÞcðtÞ
rb
 
, ð10Þ
where p* and c* are the price and unit cost of production upon the new machines. Firms compute their replacement
investment summing up the number of old machine-tools satisfying Eq. (10).1411 For maximum simplicity, here we use the rule Dej (t)=Dj(t1). In Dosi et al. (2006a) we check the robustness of the simulation results employing
more sophisticated expectation-formation rules. We found that increasing the computational capabilities of ﬁrms does not signiﬁcantly change either the
average growth rates or the stability of the economy. These properties still hold in the model presented here.
12 We assume that in any give period ﬁrm capital growth rates cannot exceed a ﬁxed maximum threshold consistent with the maximum capital
growth rates found in the empirical literature on ﬁrm investment patterns (e.g. Doms and Dunne, 1998).
13 This in line with a large body of empirical analyses (e.g. Feldstein and Foot, 1971; Eisner, 1972; Goolsbee, 1998) showing that replacement
investment is typically not proportional to the capital stock.
14 Moreover, they also scrap the machines older than Z periods (with Z being a positive integer).
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manufactured machine-tools they are aware of. As we mentioned above (cf. Section 2.2) the capital-good market is
systematically characterized by imperfect information. This implies that consumption-good ﬁrms compare ‘‘brochures’’
describing the characteristics of machines only from a subset of equipment suppliers. Firms then choose the machines with
the lowest price and unit cost of production (i.e., piðtÞþbcðAti ,tÞÞ and send their orders to the correspondingly machine
manufacturer. Machine production is a time-consuming process: capital-good ﬁrms deliver the ordered machine-tools at
the end of the period.15 Gross investment of each ﬁrm (Ij) is the sum of expansion and replacement investment. Pooling the
investment of all consumption-good ﬁrms one gets aggregate investment (I).
Consumption-good ﬁrms have to ﬁnance their investments as well as their production, as they advance worker wages.
In line with a growing number of theoretical and empirical papers (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992; Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1993a; Hubbard, 1998) we assume imperfect capital markets. This implies that the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms matters
(external funds are more expensive than internal ones) and ﬁrms may be credit rationed. More speciﬁcally, consumption-
good ﬁrms ﬁnance production using their stock of liquid assets (NWj). If liquid assets do not fully cover production costs,
ﬁrms borrow the remaining part paying an interest rate r up to a maximum debt/sales ratio of L. Only ﬁrms that are not
production-rationed can try to fulﬁll their investment plans employing their residual stock of liquid assets ﬁrst and then
their residual borrowing capacity.16
Given their current stock of machines, consumption-good ﬁrms compute average productivity (pj) and unit cost of
production (cj). Prices are set applying a variable markup (mj) on unit costs of production:
pjðtÞ ¼ ð1þmjðtÞÞcjðtÞ: ð11Þ
Markup variations are regulated by the evolution of ﬁrm market shares (fj)
17:
mjðtÞ ¼ mjðt1Þ 1þu
fjðt1Þfjðt2Þ
fjðt2Þ
 
,
with 0rur1.
The consumption-good market too is characterized by imperfect information (antecedents in the same spirits are
Phelps and Winter, 1970; Klemperer, 1987; Farrel and Shapiro, 1988; see also the empirical literature on consumers’
imperfect price knowledge surveyed in Rotemberg, 2008). This implies that consumers do not instantaneously switch to
products made by more competitive ﬁrms. However, prices are clearly one of the key determinants of ﬁrms’
competitiveness (Ej). The other component is the level of unﬁlled demand (lj) inherited from the previous period:
EjðtÞ ¼ o1pjðtÞo2ljðtÞ, ð12Þ
where o1,2 are positive parameters.18 Weighting the competitiveness of each consumption-good ﬁrm by its past market
share (fj), one can compute the average competitiveness of the consumption-good sector:
EðtÞ ¼
XF2
j ¼ 1
EjðtÞfjðt1Þ:
Such variable represents also a moving selection criterion driving, other things being equal, expansion, contraction and
extinction within the population of ﬁrms. We parsimoniously model this market setup letting ﬁrm market shares evolve
according to a ‘‘quasi’’ replicator dynamics (for antecedents in the evolutionary camp cf. Silverberg et al., 1988; Metcalfe,
1994a):
fjðtÞ ¼ fjðt1Þ 1þw
EjðtÞEðtÞ
EðtÞ
 !
, ð13Þ
with w40.19
The proﬁts (Pj) of each consumption-good ﬁrm reads
PjðtÞ ¼ SjðtÞcjðtÞQjðtÞrDebjðtÞ,15 Among the empirical literature investigating the presence of gestation-lag effects in ﬁrm investment expenditures see e.g. Del Boca et al. (2008).
16 If investment plans cannot be fully realized, ﬁrms give priority to capital stock expansion, as compared to the substitution of old machines.
17 This is close to the spirit of ‘‘customer market’’ models originated by the seminal work of Phelps andWinter (1970). See also Klemperer (1995) for a
survey and the exploration of some important macro-implications by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003).
18 Recall that consumption-good ﬁrms ﬁx production according to their demand expectations, which may differ from actual demand. If the ﬁrm
produced too much, the inventories pile up, whereas if its production is lower than demand plus inventories, its competitiveness is accordingly reduced.
19 Strictly speaking, a canonic replicator dynamics evolves on the unit simplex with all entities having positive shares. Eq. (13) allows shares to
become virtually negative. In that case, the ﬁrm is declared dead and market shares are accordingly re-calculated. This is what we mean by a ‘‘quasi-
replicator’’ dynamics. Note that an advantage of such formulation is that it determines at the same time changes in market shares and extinction events.
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evolution of its stock of liquid assets (NWj):
NWjðtÞ ¼NWjðt1ÞþPjðtÞcIjðtÞ,
where cIj is the amount of internal funds employed by ﬁrm j to ﬁnance investment.
2.4. Schumpeterian exit and entry dynamics
At the end of each period we let ﬁrms with (quasi) zero market shares or negative net assets die and we allow a new
breed of ﬁrms to enter the markets. We keep the number of ﬁrms ﬁxed, hence any dead ﬁrm is replaced by a new one.
In line with the empirical literature on ﬁrm entry (Caves, 1998; Bartelsman et al., 2005), we assume that entrants are on
average smaller than incumbents, with the stock of capital of new consumption-good ﬁrms and the stock of liquid assets of
entrants in both sectors being a fraction of the average stocks of the incumbents.20 Concerning the technology of entrants,
new consumption-good ﬁrms select amongst the newest vintages of machines, according to the ‘‘brochure mechanism’’
described above. The process- and product-related knowledge of new capital-good ﬁrms is drawn from a Beta distribution,
whose shape and support is shifted and ‘‘twisted’’ according to whether entrants enjoy an advantage or a disadvantage
vis-a-vis incumbents.21 In fact, the distribution of opportunities for entrants vs. incumbents is a crucial characteristics of
different sectoral technological regimes and plays a role somewhat akin to the distance from the technological frontier of
entrants discussed in Aghion and Howitt (2007).
2.5. The labor market
The labor market is certainly not Walrasian: real-wage does not clear the market and involuntary unemployment as
well as labor rationing are the rules rather than the exceptions. The aggregate labor demand (LD) is computed summing up
the labor demand of capital- and consumption-good ﬁrms. The aggregate supply (LS) is exogenous and inelastic. Hence
aggregate employment (L) is the minimum between LD and LS.
The wage rate is determined by institutional and market factors, with both indexation mechanisms upon consumption
prices and average productivity, on the one hand, and, adjustments to unemployment rates, on the others:
wðtÞ ¼wðt1Þþ 1þc1
DABðtÞ
ABðt1Þ
þc2
DcpiðtÞ
cpiðt1Þ þc3
DUðtÞ
Uðt1Þ
 !
, ð14Þ
where AB is the average labor productivity, cpi is the consumer price index, and U is the unemployment rate. Various
institutional regimes for the labor market can be designed changing the system parameters c1,2,3.
22
2.6. Consumption, taxes, and public expenditures
An otherwise black boxed public sector levies taxes on ﬁrm proﬁts and worker wages or on proﬁts only and pays to
unemployed workers a subsidy (wu), that is a fraction of the current market wage (i.e., wuðtÞ ¼jwðtÞ, with j 2 ð0,1Þ).
In fact, taxes and subsidies are the ﬁscal leverages that contribute to the aggregate demand management regimes (we shall
explore this issue in more detail below). Note that a ‘‘zero tax, zero subsidy’’ scenario is our benchmark for a pure
Schumpeterian regime of institutional governance.
Aggregate consumption (C) is computed by summing up over the income of both employed and unemployed workers:
CðtÞ ¼wðtÞLDðtÞþwuðLSLDðtÞÞ: ð15Þ
The model satisﬁes the standard national account identities: the sum of value added of capital- and consumption goods
ﬁrms (Y) equals their aggregate production since in our simpliﬁed economy there are no intermediate goods, and that in
turn coincides with the sum of aggregate consumption, investment and change in inventories (DN):
XF1
i ¼ 1
QiðtÞþ
XF2
j ¼ 1
QjðtÞ ¼ YðtÞ  CðtÞþ IðtÞþDNðtÞ:
The dynamics generated at the micro-level by decisions of a multiplicity of heterogenous, adaptive agents and by their
interaction mechanisms is the explicit microfoundation of the dynamics for all aggregate variables of interest (e.g. output,
investment, employment, etc.). However, as the model amply demonstrates, the aggregate properties of the economy do20 The stock of capital of a new consumption-good ﬁrm is obtained multiplying the average stock of capital of the incumbents by a random draw from a
Uniform distribution with support ½f1 ,f2, 0of1 ,of2r1. In the same manner, the stock of liquid assets of an entrant is computed multiplying the average
stock of liquid assets of the incumbents of the sector by a random variable distributed according to a Uniform with support ½f3 ,f4, 0of3 ,of4r1.
21 More precisely, the technology of capital-good ﬁrms is obtained applying a coefﬁcient extracted from a Beta(a2 ,b2) distribution to the
endogenously evolving technology frontier (Amax(t),Bmax(t)), where Amax(t) and Bmax(t) are the best technology available to incumbents.
22 For more detailed modelizations of the labor market in a evolutionary/ACE framework see e.g. Tesfatsion (2000), Fagiolo et al. (2004), and
Neugart (2008).
Table 1
Benchmark parameters.
Description Symbol Value
Number of ﬁrms in capital-good industry F1 50
Number of ﬁrms in consumption-good industry F2 200
R&D investment propensity n 0.04
R&D allocation to innovative search x 0.50
Firm search capabilities parameters z1,2 0.30
Beta distribution parameters (innovation process) ða1 ,b1Þ (3,3)
Beta distribution support (innovation process) ½x1 ,x1 [0.15,0.15]
New-customer sample parameter g 0.50
Capital-good ﬁrm mark-up rule m1 0.04
Desired inventories i 0.10
Payback period b 3
‘‘Physical’’ scrapping age Z 20
Mark-up coefﬁcient u 0.04
Competitiveness weights o1,2 1
Replicator dynamics coefﬁcient w 1
Maximum debt/sales ratio L 2
Interest rate r 0.01
Uniform distribution supports ½f1 ,f2 [0.10,0.90]
(consumption-good entrant capital)
Uniform distribution supports ½f3 ,f4 [0.10,0.90]
(entrant stock of liquid assets)
Beta distribution parameters ða2 ,b2Þ (2,4)
(capital-good entrants technology)
Wage setting DAB weight c1 1
Wage setting Dcpi weight c2 0
Wage setting DU weight c3 0
Tax rate tr 0.10
Unemployment subsidy rate j 0.40
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also that any ‘‘representative agent’’ compression of microheterogeneity is likely to offer a distorted account of both what
agents do and of the collective outcomes of their actions—indeed, well in tune with the arguments of Kirman (1992) and
Solow (2008).3. Empirical validation
The foregoing model does not allow for analytical, closed-form solutions. This general ABM distinctive feature stems
from the non-linearities present in agent decision rules and their interaction patterns, and it forces us to run computer
simulations to analyze the properties of the stochastic processes governing the coevolution of micro- and macro-
variables.23 In what follows, we therefore perform extensive Monte-Carlo analyses to wash away across-simulation
variability. Consequently, all results below refer to across-run averages over 100 replications and their standard-error
bands.24
Let us start from a sort of ‘‘benchmark’’ setup for which the model is empirically validated, i.e. it is studied in its ability
to replicate a wide spectrum of microeconomic and macroeconomic stylized facts. Initial conditions and parameters of the
benchmark setup are presented in Table 1.
As it should be clear from the forgoing presentation of the model, it embodies both a Schumpeterian engine and a
Keynesian one. The former rests in the generation of innovations by an ensemble of equipment producers which
expensively search and endogenously differentiate in the technology they are able to master. The Keynesian engine has
two parts: a direct one—through ﬁscal policies—and an indirect one—via investment decisions and workers’ consumption.
Hence, the benchmark model appropriately embodies all such Schumpeterian and Keynesian features.
Next we tune so to speak ‘‘up’’ and ‘‘down’’ the key policy variables (e.g. tax rates and unemployment beneﬁts) and we
experiment with different conditions affecting the access to and exploitation of new technological opportunities (e.g. the
patent regime, anti-trust policies).23 Some methodological issues concerning the exploration of the properties of evolutionary/ACE models are discussed in e.g. Lane (1993), Pyka and
Fagiolo (2007), Fagiolo et al. (2007), and Fagiolo and Roventini (forthcoming).
24 Preliminary exercises conﬁrm that, for the majority of statistics under study, Monte-Carlo distributions are sufﬁciently symmetric and unimodal to
justify the use of across-run averages as meaningful synthetic indicators.
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macroeconomic aggregates and the underlying distribution of micro characteristics (more on both in the direct
antecedents to this model: cf. Dosi et al., 2006a, 2008).
Growth and ﬂuctuations. The model robustly generates endogenous self-sustained growth patterns characterized by the
presence of persistent ﬂuctuations (cf. Fig. 1). At business cycle frequencies, bandpass-ﬁltered output, investment and
consumption series (Bpf, cf. Baxter and King, 1999) display the familiar ‘‘roller-coaster’’ dynamics (see Fig. 2) observed in0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
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Fig. 1. Level of output, investment, and consumption (logs).
Fig. 2. Bandpass-ﬁltered output, investment, and consumption.
Table 2
Output, investment, and consumption statistics.
Output Consumption Investment
Avg. growth rate 0.0254 0.0252 0.0275
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Dickey–Fuller test (logs) 6.7714 9.4807 0.2106
(0.0684) (0.0957) (0.0633)
Dickey–Fuller test (Bpf) 6.2564* 5.8910* 6.8640*
(0.0409) (0.0447) (0.0905)
Std. dev. (Bpf) 0.0809 0.0679 0.4685
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0266)
Rel. std. dev. (output) 1 0.8389 5.7880
Bpf: bandpass-ﬁltered (6,32,12) series. Monte-Carlo simulation standard errors in parentheses. (*): Signiﬁcant at 5%.
Table 3
Correlation structure.
Series (Bpf) Output (Bpf)
t4 t3 t2 t1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Output 0.1022 0.1769 0.5478 0.8704 1 0.8704 0.5478 0.1769 0.1022
(0.0090) (0.0080) (0.0048) (0.0014) (0) (0.0014) (0.0048) (0.0080) (0.0090)
Consumption 0.1206 0.0980 0.4256 0.7563 0.9527 0.9248 0.6848 0.3394 0.0250
(0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0106) (0.0062) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0058) (0.0072)
Investment 0.2638 0.3123 0.2646 0.0864 0.1844 0.4473 0.5950 0.5757 0.4206
(0.0102) (0.0137) (0.0182) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0175) (0.0139) (0.0123) (0.0129)
Net investment 0.0838 0.0392 0.2195 0.4010 0.5114 0.5037 0.3850 0.2105 0.0494
(0.0122) (0.0167) (0.0216) (0.0235) (0.0211) (0.0153) (0.0103) (0.0112) (0.0138)
Ch. in invent. 0.0072 0.1184 0.2349 0.2948 0.2573 0.1331 0.0199 0.1319 0.1640
(0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0085) (0.0067)
Employment 0.3240 0.1901 0.0796 0.4083 0.6692 0.7559 0.6451 0.4067 0.1555
(0.0087) (0.0123) (0.0151) (0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0120) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0082)
Unempl. rate 0.3357 0.2084 0.0596 0.3923 0.6607 0.7550 0.6489 0.4112 0.1583
(0.0083) (0.0118) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0120) (0.0084) (0.0070) (0.0082)
Productivity 0.1180 0.3084 0.5316 0.7108 0.7672 0.6656 0.4378 0.1664 0.0609
(0.0097) (0.0088) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0126) (0.0128)
Price 0.2558 0.3181 0.2702 0.0916 0.1645 0.3950 0.5067 0.4688 0.3249
(0.0167) (0.0218) (0.0235) (0.0216) (0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0225) (0.0210) (0.0176)
Inﬂation 0.1070 0.0841 0.3110 0.4456 0.4021 0.1966 0.0628 0.2478 0.2900
(0.0151) (0.0135) (0.0175) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0188) (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0131)
Mark-up 0.2183 0.1599 0.0411 0.0988 0.2040 0.2361 0.1968 0.1226 0.0580
(0.0118) (0.0088) (0.0128) (0.0184) (0.0213) (0.0206) (0.0174) (0.0135) (0.0107)
Bpf: bandpass-ﬁltered (6,32,12) series. Monte-Carlo simulation standard errors in parentheses.
G. Dosi et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1748–1767 1757real data (e.g. Stock and Watson, 1999; Napoletano et al., 2006). Moreover, in tune with the empirical evidence, both
consumption and investment appear to be procyclical variables with the latter series being also more volatile than GDP.
Output, consumption and investment display strictly positive average growth rates25 (cf. Table 2) and, according to
Dickey–Fuller tests, they seem to exhibit a unit root. After detrending the series with a bandpass ﬁlter, we compute
standard deviations and cross-correlations between output and the other series. In line with the empirical literature on
business cycles (cf. Stock and Watson, 1999), also in our model investment is more volatile than output, whereas
consumption is less volatile; consumption, investment, change in inventories, and employment are procyclical;
unemployment is countercyclical (cf. Table 3).2625 The average growth rate of variable X (e.g. GDP) is simply deﬁned as
GRX ¼
logXðTÞlogXð0Þ
Tþ1 ,
where T=600 is the econometric sample size. This value for T is a quite conservative choice, as the ﬁrst iterative moments of growth statistics converge to
a stable behavior well before such a time horizon. This means that the model reaches a relatively (meta) stable behavior quite soon after simulations start.
Our experiment show that choosing larger values for T does not alter the main economic implications of the paper.
26 Consumption and net investment are also coincident variables matching yet another empirical regularity on business cycles. Changes in
inventories are instead slightly lagging.
Table 4
Growth-rate distributions, estimation of exponential-power parameters.
Series b Std. dev. a Std. dev. m Std. dev.
Capital-good 0.5285 0.0024 0.4410 0.0189 0.0089 0.0002
Consumption-good 0.4249 0.0051 0.0289 0.0037 0.0225 0.0001
Output 1.4673 0.0122 0.0775 0.0004 0.0027 0.0003
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Fig. 3. Pooled (year-standardized) capital-good ﬁrm sales distributions. Log rank vs. log size plots.
G. Dosi et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1748–17671758The model is also able to match the business-cycle properties concerning productivity, price, inﬂation and markups (see
Table 3): productivity is procyclical, prices are countercyclical and leading; inﬂation is procyclical and lagging; markups
are countercyclical (for the empirics and discussion cf. Stock and Watson, 1999; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999).
Finally, the aggregate growth rates of output display fat-tailed distributions well in tune with the empirical evidence (cf.
Table 4; see Castaldi and Dosi, 2009; Fagiolo et al., 2008). Informally, this means that both in our model and in reality
relatively big ‘‘spurs of growth’’ and recessions occur much more frequently than it would be predicted on the grounds of
normally distributed shocks (see also below on ﬁrm growth patterns).
Distributions of microeconomics characteristics. Together with the ability of the model to account for a rich ensemble of
macro-phenomena, how does it fare in its matching with the evidence on the ubiquitous microheterogeneity? Let us
consider the regularities concerning ﬁrm-size and growth-rate distributions, ﬁrm-productivity dynamics and ﬁrm-
investment patterns which are generated by the model.
To begin with, well in tune with the empirical evidence (Dosi, 2007), rank-size plots and normality tests suggest that
cross-section ﬁrm (log) size distributions are skewed and not log-normal (see Figs. 3 and 4 and Table 5). Moreover, the
estimation of the shape parameters of exponential-power (Subbotin) distributions27 shows that pooled ﬁrm growth-rate
distributions are ‘‘tent-shaped’’ with tails fatter than the Gaussian benchmark (see Table 4 and, for a comparison with the
empirical evidence and some interpretation, see Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003, 2006).
Turning to ﬁrm productivity, again in line with the empirical evidence (cf. the surveys in Bartelsman and Doms, 2000;
Dosi, 2007), ﬁrms strikingly differ in terms of labor productivity (cf. standard deviations of labor productivity across ﬁrms27 We estimate a distribution of the form:
f ðx; b,a,mÞ ¼ 1
2ab1=bGð1þ 1bÞ
eð1=bÞjðxmÞ=aj
b
:
In a Subbotin distribution one parameter—b, in Table 4—governs the fatness of the tails. The Normal distribution is recovered when b=2, the fatter
Laplace distribution when b=1.
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Fig. 4. Pooled (year-standardized) consumption-good ﬁrm sales distributions. Log rank vs. log size plots.
Table 5
Log-size distributions, normality tests.
Industry Jarque–Bera Lilliefors Anderson–Darling
Stat. p-Value Stat. p-Value Stat. p-Value
Capital-good 20.7982 0 0.0464 0 4.4282 0
Consumption-good 3129.7817 0 0.0670 0 191.0805 0
G. Dosi et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1748–1767 1759plotted in Fig. 5), productivity differentials persist over time (cf. ﬁrm productivity autocorrelations reported in Table 6)28
and productivity growth rates are Laplace distributed (i.e. again, the distribution exhibits fat tails).
Finally, we have analyzed ﬁrm investment patterns. The model is indeed able to generate as an emergent property
investment lumpiness (Doms and Dunne, 1998; Caballero, 1999). Indeed, in each time step, consumption-good ﬁrms with
‘‘near’’ zero investment coexist with ﬁrms experiencing investment spikes (see Fig. 6 and relate it to Gourio and Kashyap,
2007).4. Policy experiments: tuning Schumpeterian and Keynesian regimes
The model, we have seen, is empirically quite robust in that it accounts, together, for a large number of empirical
regularities. It certainly passes a much higher ‘‘testing hurdle’’, as Solow (2008) puts it, than simply reproducing ‘‘a few of
the low moments of observed time series: ratios of variances or correlation coefﬁcients, for instance’’ (p. 245) as most
current models content themselves with. Encouraged by that empirical performance of the model, let us experiment with
different structural conditions (e.g. concerning the nature of innovative opportunities) and policy regimes, and study their
impact on output growth rates, volatility and rates of unemployment.2928 In the last 200 periods of the simulations, we consider the autocorrelation of ﬁrms that survived for at least 20 periods and we compute the
industry average.
29 Interestingly, most other statistical regularities concerning the structure of the economy (e.g. size distributions, fatness of ﬁrms growth rates, etc.)
appear to hold across an ample parameter range, under positive technological progress, even when policies undergo the changes we study in the
following.
Table 6
Average autocorrelation of productivity.
Industry t1 t2
Capital-good 0.5433 0.3700
(0.1821) (0.2140)
Consumption-good 0.5974 0.3465
(0.2407) (0.2535)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time
P
er
ce
nt
I/K < 0.02
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time
P
er
ce
nt
I/K > 0.35
Fig. 6. Investment lumpiness. First panel: share of ﬁrms with (near) zero investment; second panel: share of ﬁrms with investment spikes.
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Fig. 5. Firms’ productivity moments (logs). First panel: capital-good ﬁrms. Second panel: consumption-good ﬁrms.
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Table 7
Schumpeterian regime technological and industrial policy experiments.
Experiment Description Avg. GDP growth rate GDP std. dev. (Bpf) Avg. unemployment
0 Benchmark scenario 0.0254 0.0809 0.1072
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0050)
1.1 Low technological opportunities 0.0195 0.0794 0.1357
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0050)
1.2 High technological opportunities 0.0315 0.0828 0.1025
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0051)
2.1 Low search capabilities 0.0231 0.0825 0.1176
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0059)
2.2 High search capabilities 0.0268 0.0775 0.1031
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0048)
3.1 No imitation 0.0254 0.0693 0.1049
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0059)
3.2 Patent (length only) 0.0242 0.0761 0.1132
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0060)
3.3 Patent (breadth, too) 0.0163 0.0631 0.1329
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0067)
4.1 Low entrant expected productivity 0.0183 0.0798 0.1402
(0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0084)
4.2 Higher entrant expected productivity 0.0376 0.0697 0.0853
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0047)
5.1 Weak antitrust 0.0265 0.0698 0.1036
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0043)
5.2 Strong antitrust 0.0273 0.0508 0.0837
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0036)
6 Schumpeter-only, no ﬁscal policy 0.0110 1.5511 0.7855
(0.0018) (0.0427) (0.0274)
Bpf: bandpass-ﬁltered (6,32,12) series. Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in parentheses.
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Consider ﬁrst the Schumpeterian side of the economy, holding the ‘‘Keynesian engine’’ constant as compared with the
benchmark scenario30: Table 7 summarizes the results. Let us start by turning off endogenous technological opportunities.
In this case, the model collapses onto a barebone 2-sector Solow (1956) model in steady state, with ﬁxed coefﬁcients and
zero growth (absent demographic changes).
Opportunities and search capabilities.What happens if one changes the opportunities of technological innovation and the
ability to search for them? Experiment 1 (Table 7) explores such a case. As compared to the benchmark, we shift rightward
and leftward the mass of the Beta distribution governing new technological draws (i.e. the parameters a1 and b1,
cf. Section 2.2). Note that the support of the distribution remains unchanged, so that one could informally state that the
notional possibilities of drift in the technological frontier remain unchanged, too. However, the ‘‘pool’’ of opportunities
agents actually face get either richer or more rareﬁed. We ﬁnd that higher opportunities have a positive impact on the
long-term rate of growth, reduce average unemployment and slightly increase GDP volatility (a mark of Schumpeterian
‘‘gales of creative destruction’’?).
Somewhat similarly, higher search capabilities approximated by the possibilities of accessing ‘‘innovations’’—no matter
if failed or successful ones—(cf. the z1,2 parameters in Eqs. (4) and (5)) positively inﬂuence the rates of growth and lower
unemployment. Together, business cycle ﬂuctuations are dampened possibly because a population of ‘‘more competent’’
ﬁrms entails lower degrees of technological asymmetries across them and indeed also lower degrees of ‘‘creative
destruction’’. See experiment 2, Table 7.
Note that such role of innovative opportunities and search capabilities is in principle equivalent to that black-boxed
into the more aggregate notions of ‘‘human capital’’ (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) and of
‘‘appropriate institutions’’ (Acemoglu et al., 2006).31
Appropriability conditions. In many current models with a (neo) Schumpeterian engine, appropriability conditions play a
key role via their assumptions on the forward looking rationality of the agent(s) investing into uncertain innovative search:
the degrees of monopoly appropriation of the economic beneﬁts from successful search parametrize the equilibrium30 The full list of parameters under different policy scenarios is available from the authors on request.
31 In fact, given the increasing availability of microdata one can start thinking of disaggregated empirical proxies for our variables. The issue is,
however, well beyond the scope of this work.
Table 8
Keynesian regime ﬁscal policy experiments.
Tax rate Unemployment subsidy
(in % of wages)
Avg. GDP growth rate GDP std. dev. (Bpf) Avg. unemployment
0 0 0.0035 1.5865 0.8868
(0.0012) (0.0319) (0.0201)
0.05 0.20 0.0254 0.1539 0.1952
(0.0002) (0.0025) (0.0086)
0.10 0.40 0.0252 0.0809 0.1072
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0050)
0.15 0.60 0.0251 0.0630 0.0846
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0034)
0.20 0.80 0.0254 0.0584 0.0602
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0027)
0.25 1 0.0252 0.0564 0.0551
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0023)
Bpf: bandpass-ﬁltered (6,32,12) series. Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in parentheses.
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and assumed a ﬁxed propensity to invest in R&D—again, quite in tune with the evidence displaying relatively sticky
and sectoral speciﬁc propensities. Granted that, how do changes in appropriability conditions affect aggregate
dynamics?
We ﬁrst studied an extreme condition (albeit rather common in the theoretical literature), turning off the possibility of
imitation, and assuming that all R&D is invested in innovative search. Interestingly (and admittedly to the surprise of
the authors) we basically ﬁnd no differences vis-a-vis the benchmark scenario: compare experiment 3.1 with
experiment 0, Table 7.
Let us then try to mimic the effect of a patent system. Under a ‘‘length only’’ patent scenario, the innovative technology
cannot be imitated for a given number of periods determined by the patent length (cf. experiment 3.2, Table 7). Such
patenting possibility is detrimental to long-run growth and also augments the average rate of unemployment. The negative
aggregate impact of the patent system is reinforced if each ﬁrm cannot innovate in some neighborhood of the other ﬁrms’
technologies—i.e. in the presence of a patent breadth: see experiment 3.3, Table 7.32
Entry and competition policies. Important dimensions of distinct Schumpeterian regimes of innovation regard, ﬁrst, the
advantages/disadvantages that entrants face vis-a-vis incumbents and, second, the market conditions placing economic
rewards and punishments upon heterogenous competitors.
The ﬁrst theme cuts across the evolutionary and neo-Schumpeterian literature and sometimes is dramatized as a
‘‘Schumpeterian Mark I’’ vs. a ‘‘Schumpeterian Mark II’’ scenarios, meaning systematic innovative advantages for
entrepreneurial entrants vs. cumulative advantages of incumbents (cf. Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Dosi et al., 1995).
In our model, technological entry barriers (or advantages) are captured by the probability distribution over the
‘‘technological draws’’ of entrants. Again, we hold constant the support over which the economy (i.e. every ﬁrm thereof)
may draw innovative advances, conditional on the technology at any t. In this case we do it for the sake of consistency:
results, even more so, apply if different regimes are also allowed to entail different probability supports. Let us ﬁrst tune
the Beta distribution parameters a2 and b2 (cf. Section 2.4). Our results are broadly in line with the evidence discussed in
Aghion and Howitt (2007): other things being equal, the easiness of entry and competence of entrants bears a positive
impact upon long-term growth, mitigates business cycles ﬂuctuations and reduces average unemployment. See
experiments 4.1 and 4.2, Table 7. However, the ceteris paribus condition is equally important: the same aggregate growth
patterns can be proved to be equally guaranteed by competent cumulative learning of incumbents (see, above, the
exercises on search capabilities).
What about competitive conditions? We introduce antitrust policies by forbidding capital-good ﬁrms to exceed a given
market share (75% in experiment 5.1 and 50% in experiment 5.2, Table 7): the outcome is a lower unemployment rate,
smaller business cycle ﬂuctuations and also higher GDP growth (on this point see also Fogel et al., 2008). Note that such a
property have little to do with any static ‘‘welfare gains’’—which our model does not explicitly contemplates—but rather
with the multiplicity of producers, and thus of innovative search avenues, which antitrust policies safeguard.3332 On purpose, we did not introduce any feedback between changes in IPR regimes and propensities to search. As discussed in Dosi et al. (2006b),
such a link is absent in all historical evidence on the effects of changes in patenting regimes and both investment in R&D and innovative intensity.
33 The thrust of our results on policies affecting entry, competition, and variety preservation are indeed broadly in tune with the advocacy for
‘‘evolutionary technology policies’’ in Metcalfe (1994b), while it runs against the so-called ‘‘Schumpeterian hypothesis’’ according to which degrees of
industrial concentration should be conducive to higher rates of innovation.
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times the tax rate.
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So far we have explored the effects of different means of ‘‘Schumpeterian’’ policies and organizational setups over the
long term (i.e. over the rate of growth of the economy) and on unemployment rates and output volatilities. We did ﬁnd
signiﬁcant effects both on the long and short terms. However, to repeat, such results are conditional on a ‘‘Keynesian
machine’’ well in place. What happens if we switch that off? Remarkably, the system dramatically slows down in terms of
rates of growth, unemployment shoots up to utterly unrealistic levels and volatility increases. Note that it does so even if
we consider a regime with simultaneously ‘‘high opportunities’’ and ‘‘high search capabilities’’ (experiment 6, Table 7).
So for example, for the same richness of innovative opportunities, the long-term rate of growth falls to around a third
(compare experiments 6 and 1.2).
Let us further explore the role of ﬁscal policies over both the short- and long-term properties of the economy. Consider
the experiments presented in Table 8. We begin with eschewing the public sector from the economy by setting both tax
rate and unemployment beneﬁts to zero while keeping the benchmark Schumpeterian characteristics in place. In such a
scenario, the economy experiments wilder ﬂuctuations and higher unemployment rates in the short-run, but also an
output growth in the long-run not far from nil. Countercyclical Keynesian policies, as in the common wisdom, act indeed
like a parachute during recessions, sustaining consumption and, indirectly, investment on the demand side. However, they
also bear long-term effects on the supply side: in particular on the rates of growth of productivity and output. Such a vicious
feedback loop goes from low output to low investment in R&D, low rates of innovation (cf. Eq. (3)) similar to that pointed
out by Stiglitz (1994).34 In fact, in the latter as well as in our model, the system may be ‘‘trapped’’ into a low growth
trajectories which cannot be unlocked from by a ‘‘Schumpeterian jumpstart’’. Indeed, as we have seen above (experiment
6, Table 7) Schumpeterian policies alone are not able to sustain high growth patterns and, even less so, mild business cycle
ﬂuctuations and low unemployment.
Let us then allow for Keynesian demand macro-management policies and repeatedly increase both the tax and the
unemployment beneﬁt rates. Tuning up ﬁscal demand management does delock the economy from the ‘‘bad’’ trajectory34 On the negative links between macroeconomic volatility, R&D investment, and long-run economic growth in presence of ﬁnancial market
imperfections, see also Aghion et al. (2008, 2010).
Table 9
Robustness of simulation results to alternative labor-market institutional regimes.
Parameters Avg. GDP
growth rate
Avg.
unemployment
GDP std.
dev. (bpf)
Rel. std. dev. Cons. Corr. Net Inv. Corr.
c1 c2 c3 Cons. Inv. t1 t t+1 t1 t t+1
1 0 0 0.0252 0.1072 0.0809 0.84 5.79 0.76 0.95 0.92 0.40 0.51 0.50
(0.0002) (0.0050) (0.0007)
1 0.75 0 0.0249 0.1167 0.0766 0.82 6.83 0.79 0.96 0.91 0.49 0.57 0.52
(0.0002) (0.0059) (0.0063)
1 0 0.90 0.0251 0.1207 0.0761 0.81 6.57 0.80 0.96 0.91 0.54 0.61 0.54
(0.0002) (0.0049) (0.0062)
1 0.75 0.90 0.0246 0.1155 0.0743 0.82 5.87 0.80 0.96 0.91 0.53 0.62 0.56
(0.0002) (0.0056) (0.0061)
Bpf: bandpass-ﬁltered (6,32,12) series. Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in parentheses.
Table 10
Robustness of policy experiments to alternative labor-market institutional regimes.
Parameters Experiment Avg. GDP growth rate GDP std. dev. (bpf) Avg. unemployment
c1 c2 c3
1 0.75 0 1.1 0.0198 (0.0002) 0.0776 (0.0062) 0.1384 (0.0051)
1.2 0.0319 (0.0002) 0.0769 (0.0065) 0.0847 (0.0053)
3.1 0.0250 (0.0002) 0.0729 (0.0064) 0.1051 (0.0060)
3.3 0.0164 (0.0002) 0.0592 (0.0019) 0.1374 (0.0072)
6 0.0033 (0.0014) 1.2743 (0.0285) 0.8836 (0.0222)
tax¼ 0, f¼ 0 0.0008 (0.0009) 1.2694 (0.0244) 0.9495 (0.0153)
tax¼ 0:2, f¼ 0:8 0.0253 (0.0002) 0.0561 (0.0046) 0.0599 (0.0029)
1 0 0.9 1.1 0.0196 (0.0002) 0.0743 (0.0059) 0.1341 (0.0050)
1.2 0.0313 (0.0002) 0.0737 (0.0062) 0.0987 (0.0063)
3.1 0.0252 (0.0002) 0.0627 (0.0053) 0.1025 (0.0062)
3.3 0.0165 (0.0002) 0.0627 (0.0053) 0.1260 (0.0072)
6 0.0134 (0.0018) 1.6084 (0.0899) 0.7627 (0.0254)
tax¼ 0, f¼ 0 0.0032 (0.0012) 1.5863 (0.0890) 0.8857 (0.0197)
tax¼ 0:2, f¼ 0:8 0.0249 (0.0002) 0.0547 (0.0046) 0.0673 (0.0030)
1 0.75 0.9 1.1 0.0193 (0.0002) 0.0740 (0.0059) 0.1454 (0.0062)
1.2 0.0312 (0.0002) 0.0742 (0.0063) 0.0993 (0.0053)
3.1 0.0251 (0.0002) 0.0638 (0.0053) 0.1100 (0.0062)
3.3 0.0165 (0.0002) 0.0593 (0.0047) 0.1366 (0.0071)
6 0.0050 (0.0016) 1.2703 (0.0561) 0.8760 (0.0265)
tax¼ 0, f¼ 0 0.0001 (0.0010) 1.2236 (0.0292) 0.9322 (0.0197)
tax¼ 0:2, f¼ 0:8 0.0246 (0.0002) 0.0539 (0.0047) 0.0631 (0.0031)
Bpf: bandpass-ﬁltered (6,32,12) series. Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in parentheses.
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Fig. 7). If one further increases the size of ﬁscal measures, average output growth rates do not change as compared to the
benchmark scenario, but output volatility and unemployment signiﬁcantly fall, and the economy spends more time in full
employment (cf. again Table 8 and Fig. 7).35
Finally, we check the robustness of Keynesian properties of the system to alternative institutional regimes governing
the labor market captured by the parameters affecting the wage rate (cf. Eq. (14)). In particular, we allow wages to move as
a (negative) function of the unemployment rate. Under these ‘‘classical’’ circumstances, wages may fall during recessions,
inducing price cuts, which in turn may increase output, supposedly weakening the case for Keynesian ﬁscal policies. In fact,
the simulation exercises presented in Table 9 suggest that, other things being equal, the dynamics of the systems are
largely independent of how wages are determined. Moreover, the impact of different policy measures—including ﬁscal
policies—does not seem to substantially change under different labor-market institutional regimes (cf. Table 10). This
supports both our previous results about the importance of the ‘‘Keynesian engine’’ as a necessary ingredient of sustained35 On the long-run growth-enhancing effects of countercyclical macroeconomic policies, see the empirical evidence provided by Aghion and
Marinescu (2007).
G. Dosi et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1748–1767 1765long-run growth and Keynes (1936) own insights about the irrelevance at best of wage cuts in order to reduce
unemployment.
5. Concluding remarks
In this work we have studied the properties of an agent-based model that robustly reproduces a wide ensemble of
macro-stylized facts and distributions of micro characteristics.
The model entails the explicit account of search and investment decisions by populations of ﬁrms that are
heterogeneous in the technologies which they master and, possibly, in their decision rules. Aggregate macro properties are
emergent from the thread of interactions among economic agents, without any ex ante consistency requirements amongst
their expectations and their actions. In that sense, the model may be considered an exercise in general disequilibrium
analysis. Firms in the model endogenously generate new technologies—embodied in new types of ‘‘machines’’—via
expensive and mistake-ridden processes of search. Inventions then diffuse via the adoption decisions of machine users.
Hence, agents generate micro technological shocks and, together, micro demand shocks which propagate through the
economy.
In this respect, an important feature of the model is that it bridges Schumpeterian theories of technology-driven
economic growth with Keynesian theories of demand generation.
A central question that we address in the work is whether the ‘‘Schumpeterian engine’’ by itself is able to maintain the
economy on a high-growth/near full-employment path. Broadly speaking, the answer is negative. Such an endogenous
innovation engine is able to do that only in the presence of a ‘‘Keynesian’’ demand-generating engine, which in the present
model takes the form of public ﬁscal policies.
Our results also throw deep doubts on the traditional dichotomy between variables impacting the long-run (typically,
technology-related changes) and variables with a short-term effect (traditional demand-related variables). On the
contrary, technological innovations appear to exert their effects at all frequencies. Conversely, Keynesian demand-
management policies do not only contribute to reduce output volatility and unemployment rates, but also for a large
parameter region, they affect also long-run growth rates insofar as they contribute to ‘‘delock’’ the economy from the
stagnant growth trajectory which is indeed one of the possible emergent meta-stable states.
The model appears to be a quite broad and ﬂexible platform apt to perform a long list of experiments, few of which have
been presented above, studying the outcomes of different policies and different institutional setups. An obvious direction
of development ought to address an explicit account of credit and ﬁnancial markets (a somewhat germane attempt in this
direction is in Delli Gatti et al., 2005, broadly along Stiglitzian lines). This is also a natural step in order to also analyze the
real impact of monetary policies.
Another line of inquiry involves the comparison between alternative institutional speciﬁcations of the ways
technologies are accessed and the ways markets work, somewhat along the lines of the ‘‘variety of capitalism’’ approach
(Soskice and Hall, 2001). More generally, we view this as an example of a broader research program whereby explicit
behavioral microfoundations nest the exploration of the relations between innovative dynamics, demand generation, and
policies affecting both.
Finally, one could think to extend the model speciﬁcation in order to take on board the possibility that agents respond
to the state of the system by endogenously adapting their behavioral rules. In fact, as it happens in the majority of ABMs,
agents in our model employ behavioral rules that remain ﬁxed throughout the observed econometric sample size, in terms
of both their parameters and functional speciﬁcation. For example, adaptation of rules may be introduced in the model by
endogeneizing some parameters currently governing agents behaviors and make them sensible to macroeconomic
variables and the institutional framework. This may allow one to study the effectiveness of policy measures in the presence
of agents that actively respond to their introduction and tuning.Acknowledgments
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